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Regulation’s influence on EU banking efficiency: 
An evaluation post crisis
Edward Bace1* and Ana Ferreira1
Abstract:  This paper examines the impact of regulatory policies on banking market 
efficiency using a sample of 678 commercial banks from 21 European Union coun-
tries for the post-crisis year 2010, controlling for bank-specific and country-specific 
variables. Data on regulation, supervision and monitoring variables, and activity 
restrictions are from the most recent Bank Regulation and Supervision Survey 
database conducted by the World Bank, published 2012. Besides these we incor-
porate bank size, equity, market share, government ownership, and growth of Gross 
Domestic Product per capita, employing an Ordinary Least Squares method. Focus is 
on two alternative measures of banking market efficiency: net interest margin and 
overhead costs (operating expenses to assets). Elevated levels of these two ratios 
should indicate a low level of banking efficiency. The evidence suggests that the link 
between capital regulation and banking efficiency is not robust enough to control 
for other regulatory variables. Results confirm that activity restrictions have 
a negative and significant impact on banking efficiency. Policies encouraging official 
supervisory power do not enhance efficiency of the banking sector. The only 
approach positively and statistically significantly associated with efficiency is private 
monitoring. This leads to the suggestion that government regulation and super-
vision should be more focused on promoting transparency of information.
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1. Introduction
The global financial crisis has revived the importance of the banking system to the economy. As 
a result of the crisis, bank regulations have become more stringent to prevent future bank failures 
and safeguard the economy from negative externalities. In this regard, policymakers concentrate 
on which regulation is the best to achieve these goals. Thus, different regulatory approaches 
should be analysed as well as the effects of combining approaches. The most common are capital 
regulation, activity restrictions, official supervisory power and private monitoring. Following this, 
the present research studies each of these regulatory measures.
The globalization of banking services, the increasing competition and the technological changes have 
emphasized the importance of banking efficiency. Since banks act as financial intermediaries between 
lenders and borrowers, banking efficiency plays a crucial role in the social welfare. It is important that 
banks work to minimize costs, thus promoting efficient utilization of resources. Therefore, enhancing the 
efficiency of the banking system is vital to achieve greater social welfare. We rely on two accounting 
ratios to measure banking efficiency: net interest margin and overhead costs. While imperfect, these 
measures can signal intermediation inefficiency and excessive market power. Hence, higher net interest 
margin and higher overhead costs reflect lower levels of banking efficiency.
Nevertheless, banking literature provides conflicting predictions about the impact of bank reg-
ulation on banking efficiency. As argued by Barth et al. (2006), the different arguments usually 
reflect the two divergent views, which are the public interest view and the private interest view. 
The public interest view supports that government operates to enhance social welfare. The 
purpose of regulating the banking sector is to promote banking efficiency and prevent bank failure. 
Conversely, the private interest view states that government uses regulatory policies to satisfy 
political interests (Shleifer & Vishny, 1998). In line with this argument, regulation may exert 
adverse effects on banking efficiency.
The most common justification for any regulation stems from market failures due to asymme-
tries of information, externalities and market power. However, there is still no consensus concern-
ing whether the banks should be regulated, and which regulatory policy generates better results. 
Some argue that capital regulation decreases the occurrence of bank runs, cushioning the econ-
omy from major losses and reduce agency problems between bank owners and depositors, 
especially through deposit insurance. Others argue that stringent capital requirements encourage 
risk-taking behaviour (Blum, 1999; Boyd et al., 1998; Furlong & Keeley, 1989). By allowing banks to 
engage in broader activities, banks may become so important to the economy that they are 
deemed to be “too big to fail”, thus difficult to discipline. The power enjoyed by such complex 
banks may impede competition in the banking sector. On the other hand, restricting activities 
impedes the exploitation of economies of scope and scale (Laeven & Levine, 2007). The official 
supervisory approach stresses that supervisors have the incentives to ameliorate market failures 
as a consequence of informational asymmetries. Conversely, proponents of private monitoring 
claim that official supervisors use their power to benefit themselves. Hence, government regula-
tion that promotes private monitoring in terms of more transparency of information may be the 
most efficacious approach to enhance banking efficiency.
This study assesses empirically the impact of these regulatory measures on banking efficiency. 
The sample consists of 678 commercial banks from 21 European Union (EU) countries for the year 
2010. The information for the regulatory variables is collected from Bank Regulation and 
Supervision Survey database conducted by the World Bank (Barth et al., 2004, 2008, 2013a, 
2006, 2013b; Cihak et al., 2012), which provides unique information on how banks are regulated 
around the world. From the four surveys available, we use the data from the last survey, which is 
the first examination of this kind conducted after the financial crisis. It covers information on 
banking policies in 125 countries and was completed in 2012. We also follow the indexes aggre-
gating the responses from the survey of Barth et al. (2006), (2013a)).
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This study empirically answers the following research question: What is the impact of bank 
regulatory policies on banking efficiency? In addition to the regulatory variables, bank and country- 
specific control variables are included in our analysis. We incorporate bank size, bank equity, bank 
market share, government-owned banks and growth of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita. 
To estimate the empirical models, we employ the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method.
The study is organised as follows. Section 2 summarises the relevant banking literature and the 
main findings along with the hypotheses we aim to test. Section 3 presents the data and 
methodology, which includes data sources, measurement of the variables, descriptive statistics, 
and empirical model. Section 4 presents and discusses the empirical results. Section 5 concludes. 
The last section also discusses limitations and recommendations for future research.
2. Literature review
In this section, we summarize the prior literature related to the effects of Basel II Capital Accord 
regulations namely, capital requirements (Pillar 1), official supervisory power (Pillar 2) and market 
discipline (Pillar 3), in addition to activity restrictions on banking efficiency as well as on bank 
development, soundness, efficiency and risk incentives. Existing theories regarding different reg-
ulatory approaches are examined first, followed by the empirical evidence supporting these 
theories and hypotheses we aim to test.
Theoretical review
2.1. Capital regulation
There is extensive literature focusing on capital regulations emphasising its importance as a key 
approach to bank regulation. The capital adequacy requirements stipulate the amount of capital that 
banks need to hold for a certain level and quality of assets. Consequently, it influences the banking- 
sector efficiency. In the case of bank owners being required to increase the amount of capital at risk, 
the gains from increased risk would be counterbalanced by the greater likelihood of capital loss. 
Hence, capital regulation tends to reduce agency problems between bank owners and depositors 
(Barth et al., 2006; Kaufman, 1992; Keeley & Furlong, 1990). Moreover, two of the primary functions of 
capital are risk diversification and lower risk-taking. The former considers capital a buffer which 
protects the assets from being sold or written off at a very low price. An appropriate level of capital 
safeguards the debt holders and equity holders. The latter implies that, under more stringent capital 
regulations, bank managers and owners engage in less risky activities (Chortareas et al., 2012). Based 
on these arguments, capital regulation is expected to enhance banking efficiency.
However, the theory provides conflicting predictions about the positive effects of capital require-
ments (Santos, 2001). For instance, Barth et al. (2013b) claimed that the arguments in favour are 
based on the public interest view and the inherent costs of regulating bank capital as higher 
barriers and higher taxes charged by governments are not considered. The private interest view 
opposes capital regulation except when the benefits compensate the costs. Furthermore, some 
authors find that capital regulation increases risk-taking behaviour (e.g. Besanko & Kanatas, 1996; 
Koehn & Santomero, 1980). According to Blum (1999), stringent capital requirements increase risk- 
taking behaviour and risk of failure as a result of two effects. First, it lowers profits. If the bank has 
low profits, the cost of bankruptcy is less costly than the cost of excessive risk-taking. Lastly, it 
affects the marginal return on risk. In the model presented by the author, the marginal return on 
risk may increase, and thus the first effect may strengthen, further increasing the risk. Therefore, 
capital regulation may negatively influence banking efficiency.
Additionally, Pasiouras et al. (2009) highlighted the impact of capital requirements on the 
quantity and quality of loans, the allocation of asset portfolios and the source of funds. The 
introduction of regulatory capital requirements on an unregulated banking system may decrease 
aggregate lending while there is no consensus concerning loan quality (Deli & Hasan, 2017; 
Kopecky & VanHoose, 2006). Bank managers may also look for other forms of assets rather than 
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loans, affecting banking efficiency as different assets have different returns and require different 
management. Despite the advantages of portfolio diversification, little is known about the capacity 
of banks to manage different assets (VanHoose, 2007). Lastly, capital regulation may influence the 
decision of banks with respect to the trade-off between debt and equity.
2.1.1. Empirical review
Barth et al. (2004) analysed the effects of bank regulation and supervision on bank development, 
stability, and performance for 107 countries based on the first survey from 1999 of the Bank Regulation 
and Supervision Survey database carried out by World Bank. The results indicated that tightening capital 
requirements lowers the number of non-performing loans (used as a proxy for bank stability) while 
capital stringency is not robustly linked with banking-sector development and performance as mea-
sured by accounting ratios (net interest margin and overhead costs) when controlling for other 
regulatory and supervisory practices. Likewise, Beck et al. (2006b) addressed the influence of capital 
regulation on banking system stability using the same data for regulatory measures and found no 
statistically significant link between the two variables. However, the link is robust when using the capital 
regulatory index as a control variable for the relationship between bank concentration and fragility.
More recently, Barth et al. (2013b) investigated the impact of regulation, supervision, and monitor-
ing on banking efficiency using the non-parametric Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) approach for 
a sample of 4050 banks over 1999–2007. The regulatory and supervision variables are from the first 
three World Bank surveys of Barth et al. (2004), (2006), 2008). They found that stringent capital 
requirements are significantly associated with higher levels of banking efficiency and also the possible 
existence of a connection between banking efficiency and safety. Similarly, Chortareas et al. (2012) 
provided evidence of a positive and significant relationship between capital regulation and banking 
efficiency using the DEA approach1 as well as using accounting ratios: net interest margin and cost-to- 
income ratio. The study comprised 22 EU countries for the years 2000–2008 using the information on 
regulatory variables from the World Bank dataset. These findings are consistent with the view that 
strengthening capital regulation is associated with higher levels of banking efficiency.
Previous studies (Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2008) on the soundness of the banking system have 
highlighted the importance of regulation and supervision for sounder banks. For instance, 
Pasiouras et al. (2006) contributed to this area researching the relationship between the Fitch 
individual bank ratings and bank regulations (World Bank database) with a sample of 857 banks for 
the year 2004. Their results revealed that lower ratings are attributed to banks operating in 
markets with tighter capital regulation. Therefore, stringent capital regulation is negatively asso-
ciated with bank soundness. This is consistent with the argument that banks in countries that 
promote tighter capital adequacy requirements take on greater risk but inconsistent with the 
positive influence that capital regulation exerts on bank efficiency.
Regarding risk-taking, Laeven and Levine (2009) conducted a study of 279 banks in 48 countries 
analysing the risk-taking behaviour by banks, ownership structures and bank regulations. The 
empirical evidence of their study has shown that the interaction between capital regulations, 
assessed by minimum capital requirements and capital stringency index, and risk critically 
depends on the ownership structure of each bank. Thus, while capital regulation decreases risk- 
taking in widely held banks, it has an adverse effect when the bank has a large owner. This finding 
confirms that capital stringency reduces the benefits of owning a bank, hence large and powerful 
owners undertake riskier activities in response to more stringent capital regulations. Moreover, the 
paper emphasized the importance of including ownership structure in the analysis of the effects of 
capital regulations on risk-taking behaviour.
In line with previously mentioned studies on banking efficiency and considering the empirical 
evidence, we aim to test the following hypothesis: 
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Hypothesis 1: Capital regulation does not have a positive or significant impact on banking 
efficiency.
2.2. Activity restrictions
Although activity restrictions are not a pillar of Basel II, they have been stressed as fundamental to 
the study of the impact of regulation on the proper functioning of the banking sector. The question 
is whether the existence of financial conglomerates2 is beneficial to the performance of the 
banking system. Nevertheless, there is no consensus in theory about the effects of banks engaging 
in broader activities or restricting their activities.
The information acquired by banks during the lending process may help banks to be more efficient 
in other activities such as brokering, real estate investment or dealing mutual fund securities. In the 
same way, by engaging in broader activities, banks acquire information that can be used to improve 
the process of making loans. Therefore, restricting activities may impede banks from enjoying 
economies of scale and scope as it limits the exchange of information (Diamond, 1991; Rajan, 
1992; Stein, 2002). Moreover, it can lower the franchise value of a bank due to greater difficulty in 
diversifying revenue streams and thereby narrowing incentives for more efficient conduct. By being 
responsible for licensing banks and specifying the permitted activities, regulators become more 
powerful which gives them more opportunities to pursue economic gains (Djankov et al., 2002). 
Finally, Beck et al. (2006b) presented empirical evidence that tightening activities boosts bank fragility 
by impeding banks from diversifying portfolio risk. As a consequence of the previous arguments, 
allowing banks to engage in non-traditional activities is likely to improve banking efficiency.
On the other hand, some (Aron, 1988) argue that expanding the range of financial services may 
intensify agency problems between owners and shareholders which reduces the market value. Bank 
managers may engage in broader activities simply because it is more advantageous to them even if it 
means a lower market value for the financial institution. Therefore, the decision to restrict activities by 
managers may be due to what benefits them instead of what benefits the firm (Jensen, 1986). Also, 
moral hazard problems may arise which stimulates risk-taking behaviour (Boyd et al., 1998). 
Furthermore, it is hard to implement efficient managerial contracts in financial conglomerates as 
well as handle agency problems (Rotemberg & Saloner, 1994). Another argument is that banks 
providing a wide range of services may become so important to the economy that they are deemed 
to be “too big to fail” thus, difficult to discipline. Under these circumstances, activity restrictions may 
positively affect banking efficiency. According to Laeven and Levine (2007), diversification of activities 
decreases the market value of the financial conglomerate since the benefits of enjoying economies of 
scope are not significant enough to offset the negative effects of leading with a variety of activities. 
Consequently, restricting bank activities may enhance banking efficiency.
Researchers (King and Levine, 1993) focusing on the impact of activity restrictions on banking 
efficiency and development have concluded mixed results for the association between the two 
variables. The results are consistent with the view that relaxing restrictions on bank activities improves 
banking efficiency by increasing opportunities for diversifying sources of income. Barth et al. (2004) 
found that while regulation of activities negatively affects bank development, there is no robust link 
between this regulatory measure and net interest margin or overhead costs or non-performing loans. 
The former finding is notably important since the development of the banking system directly 
influences economic growth.3 In addition, their study supported that a banking system with greater 
freedom on activities is less likely to suffer a major crisis. Kim et al. (Role of financial regulation and 
innovation in the financial crisis, Kim et al., 2013) carried out a study on the role of regulatory 
measures in the financial crisis4 using the surveys on bank regulation for 143 countries. Unlike 
Barth et al. (2004), they concluded that activity restrictions reduce the likelihood of a banking crisis. 
Therefore, diversification drives banks to engage in riskier activities, further increasing bank fragility.
Chortareas et al. (2012) confirmed that greater restrictions on bank activities exert a positive 
impact on net interest margin, cost-to-income ratio and inefficiency, which means an overall 
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negative impact on banking efficiency. Barth et al. (2013b) also corroborated that stricter restric-
tions on bank activities are negatively associated with the efficiency of the banking system, using 
the DEA approach. Moreover, Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2004) investigated the influence of bank 
regulations on the cost of financial intermediation using as proxies the net interest margin and 
the overhead expenditures. The sample comprised 1400 commercial banks in 72 countries, from 
1995 through 1999. Similar to the studies mentioned above, the regulatory measures were 
obtained from the World Bank surveys. The results showed that greater activity restrictions are 
significantly associated with greater net interest margin, consequently greater operational ineffi-
ciency and market power. With respect to the soundness of the banking system, Pasiouras et al. 
(2006) found that lower ratings are allocated to banks operating in markets with stricter activity 
regulations. Thus, restricting bank activities negatively influence banking efficiency.
Laeven and Levine (2009) proposed in their study that tighter restrictions on bank activities 
increase risk-taking behaviour when the bank has a sufficiently large owner. If the bank is widely 
held, the effects of restricting activities on risk are not significant. Since regulation on activities 
lowers the profits, bank owners may engage in riskier activities to compensate for losses. In this 
respect, Gonzalez (2005) evaluated the impact of activity restrictions on risk incentives in a study 
with 251 banks in 36 countries from 1995 to 1999. Nevertheless, the evidence has confirmed that 
greater regulatory restrictions are related to fewer risk-taking incentives after isolating the rela-
tionship between bank charter value5 and risk-taking incentives and between regulatory restric-
tions and bank charter value. The findings support that greater freedom on bank activities 
promotes risk-taking as it provides banks more opportunities to assume greater risk. Hence, the 
two studies provided conflicting predictions about the effects of activity restrictions on bank risk.
Considering the empirical evidence presented in previous banking literature on the effects of 
activity restrictions on banking efficiency, we aim to test the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: Activity restrictions have a negative and significant impact on banking efficiency.
2.3. Official supervisory power
The official supervisory power concerns the degree to which bank supervisors can take actions against 
bank owners, bank managers and bank auditors in different circumstances. While there is an 
extensive literature on the importance of empowering official supervision of banks, empirical evi-
dence (Levine, 2005) shows no consensus about the effects on bank performance. Since the costs of 
supervising banks are excessive, there are few incentives to monitor banks. Proponents of public 
interest view claim that supervisors have incentives to ameliorate market failures through the 
monitoring and discipline of banks (Beck et al., 2006a), thus undermining corruption and strengthen-
ing the intermediary function of banks. Moreover, the existence of informational asymmetries makes 
banks vulnerable to contagion risk and possible bank failure. Powerful supervisors can intervene 
effectively under these circumstances. Besides, with the adoption of deposit insurance, banks may 
undertake greater risk and depositors may have less incentives to supervise banks. Official supervisors 
may be capable of preventing such situations (Barth et al., 2004; Beck et al., 2006b). Given the 
previous arguments, it is expected that official supervisory power enhances banking efficiency.
On the contrary, proponents of private interest view claim that official supervisors use their 
power for their own interest. As powerful supervisors have access to insider information, they may 
use it for private and political benefits (Beck et al., 2006b). Political candidates may bribe super-
visors to extract votes and donations for their campaign (Djankov et al., 2002; Quintyn & Taylor, 
2003). Hence, official supervisory power may be associated with higher levels of corruption, 
negatively influencing banking efficiency. Additionally, supervisors may pursue private interests 
instead of public interests to enhance their reputation as being able to monitor banks, especially 
when there are uncertainties about their capacity to do so (Boot & Thakor, 1993). Thus, powerful 
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supervisors may adversely affect banking operations. Therefore, official supervisory power may 
positively or negatively affect the corporate governance of banks, the lending process (by encoura-
ging corruption), and the intermediary function of banks.
Nevertheless, the argument that an independent supervisory entity has positive influence on 
banking efficiency is consensual among the two opposing views. Being independent, the supervisors 
are less likely to exert power on banks to serve political and private interests. Thus, independent 
supervisors could monitor the corporate governance of banks more professionally. Moreover, they 
may better guide banks by giving them advice on how to improve (Barth et al., 2013b).
The empirical evidence indicates that official supervisory power is not significant in explaining 
bank performance itself. Barth et al. (2004) found that empowering official supervision of banks is 
not significantly associated with bank development, bank performance or the number of non- 
performing loans. The link between supervision and the likelihood of a banking crisis also proved to 
be non-significant. Similarly, the regressions in the study of Barth et al. (2013b) pointed to an 
insignificant relationship between official supervisory power and banking efficiency. The study also 
evaluated the impact of independent supervisory authorities and the interaction between the two 
variables. Their results suggested that while official supervisory power does not enhance banking 
efficiency itself, promoting the independence of supervision may strengthen banking efficiency. 
Furthermore, the interaction term confirmed that empowering official supervision leads to an 
increase in banking efficiency in countries with greater independence of supervisors. This is 
consistent with the argument that independent supervisors are less likely to pursue political and 
private interests rather than social interests, improving the corporate governance of banks.
Levine (2005) assessed the impact of supervision, specifically the official supervisory approach 
and the private monitoring approach, on banking efficiency measured by overhead costs using the 
data for the supervisory measures from Barth et al. (2004). The connection between official 
supervision and overhead costs has proven to be statistically insignificant. The research empha-
sized that the aim of the official supervisory approach may be to lower bank fragility instead of 
enhancing bank performance as a possible justification. Notwithstanding the main finding, the 
data indicated that empowering official supervision intensifies corruption in bank lending. Hence, 
the data is consistent with the private interest view.
Different results are suggested by Chortareas et al. (2012). The evidence indicated that official 
supervisory power has a positive impact on banking efficiency, which confirms the predictions of 
the public interest view. The results held using inefficiency, net interest margin or cost-to-income 
ratio as independent variables, with coefficients being negatively significant in all regressions. 
However, when controlling for private monitoring, the impact turned negative. One explanation 
may be that strengthening official oversight in less developed countries leads to increased govern-
ment participation and thus undermines the reliability of the lending process.
Beck et al. (2006a) evaluated the association between supervision and corruption in bank lending in 
a study with 2500 firms from 37 countries using the information on supervision from Barth et al. 
(2008; 2004; 2006). Corruption in bank lending is proxied by the extent to which bank supervisors’ 
corruption is a barrier for firms to get external finance. The results supported that strengthening 
official supervisory power is positively and significantly related to higher levels of corruption. This 
suggests that powerful supervisors do not improve social welfare, they improve their own welfare. 
Therefore, policies that encourage official oversight to enhance banking efficiency may have opposite 
outcomes, ultimately increasing corruption in the banking system.
The analysis of Pasiouras et al. (2006) concluded that more powerful supervision is adversely 
associated with bank ratings. Thereby, countries that promote official supervision to take specific 
actions on bank managers and owners obtain lower bank ratings. Under these circumstances, 
official supervisory power is negatively related to the soundness and efficiency of the banking 
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system and positively related to bank corruption. The study of Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2008) which 
examined the influence of compliance with the Basel Core Principles on Moody’s ratings noted that 
countries with a higher degree of compliance are better rated, although empowering official 
supervision per se does not influence bank ratings.
The evidence presented in the literature on the effects of official supervisory approach on 
banking efficiency is divided into two viewpoints, those that found negative and significant effects 
and those that found insignificant effects. This leads us to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: Official supervisory power has a negative impact on banking efficiency.
2.4. Private monitoring
Private monitoring refers to the extent to which banking regulations require banks to disclose 
accurate and detailed information to the public and improve contract enforcement mechanisms. It 
is believed that bank supervision should focus on reducing barriers such as the costs of producing 
and disclosing information. Thus, private investors could monitor more efficiently, strengthening 
the corporate governance of banks (Hay & Shleifer, 1998). Proponents of the private monitoring 
approach often express doubts about the effectiveness of the official supervisory approach. 
Therefore, the arguments in favour of the former approach tend also to be critiques to the latter 
approach and vice versa (Levine, 2005).
First, as supervisors are not usually bank shareholders, their incentives may conflict with 
incentives from private investors regarding bank discipline, consequently agency problems may 
arise (Barth et al., 2013b). Second, supervisors may be driven by self-interests. Politicians and 
banks may influence official supervisors to act in their own interests by enriching insiders and 
channelling credit to some specific companies according to the private interest view. Hence, 
empowering private monitoring over supervisory power may prevent corruption in bank lending 
from intensifying, improving banking operations at the same time (Beck et al., 2006a). Third, 
remuneration of supervisors is low in some countries which incentivises them to move to the 
banking sector. These circumstances may create different motivations for supervisors regarding 
bank monitoring (Barth et al., 2004). Lastly, while recognizing the existence of market failures that 
interferes with the effectiveness of private monitoring, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) emphasized that 
official oversight may have a more significant negative impact on banks due to the great scale of 
government failures. Following this logic, the benefits of overcoming market failures may not 
produce sufficient positive effects to promote official supervisory power over private monitoring.
Nevertheless, there are arguments against empowering private monitoring. Private monitoring 
may not enhance bank performance in countries with less developed legal systems, poor capital 
markets and ineffective financial accounting policies as people in these countries do not trust in 
private monitoring. Therefore, they may not be able to benefit from an efficient monitoring with 
the private sector, but they may benefit from official oversight. Since the banking system is very 
complex and opaque, even the private sector in more developed countries may find it hard to 
monitor banks efficiently (Barth et al., 2004). From this standpoint, strengthening private monitor-
ing may lead to bank customers being misled, and consequently deteriorating banking efficiency. 
Furthermore, costs related to disclosure of accurate information to the public such as enforcement 
costs, costs to prepare formal disclosure documents and costs of divulging delicate information to 
competitors are excessive, thus it negatively impacts banking efficiency (Duarte et al., 2008).
While the arguments mentioned above have supported one supervisory approach over the other 
between official supervision and private monitoring, the two approaches are not mutually exclu-
sive as stated by Levine (2005). Indeed, countries are able to adopt both approaches, that is, 
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requiring banks to disclose precise information to the public at the same time that official super-
visory agencies directly monitor and discipline banks.
Most of the existing studies have concluded that empowering private monitoring in terms of 
more financial transparency has a good impact on the banking system. For instance, Barth et al. 
(2004) observed that private monitoring positively influences bank development and negatively 
influences the amount of nonperforming loans and net interest margin. The study, however, failed 
to find a strong impact on bank crises when controlling for other variables. Barth et al. (2013b) 
found that private monitoring exerts positive effects on banking efficiency, specifically they found 
that strength of external auditor, bank accounting informative and certified audit requirements are 
related with higher levels of banking efficiency. Similar results were obtained in the study of Levine 
(2005) which concluded that empowering private monitoring reduces the overhead costs, boosting 
banking efficiency. One particularity of this study was that the effect lost significance in the 
regression that included GDP per capita. This means that GDP per capita is highly correlated with 
the degree of information disclosure. In a broader perspective, the economic development of 
a country is influenced by the implemented supervisory approach, just as the effectiveness of 
bank supervision depends on the economic development of the country.
Conversely, Chortareas et al. (2012) provided evidence of a negative relationship between private 
monitoring and banking efficiency. The results should be interpreted carefully since they used a sub- 
sample of countries for regressions that included this variable, excluding economically large countries 
as UK, Germany, France and Spain. A possible reason for this finding is that producing and disclosing 
information is costly. Hence, banking efficiency may be adversely affected.
Beck et al. (2006a) noticed that empowering private monitoring reduces corruption in bank 
lending. Their paper also established a positive association between bank lending integrity indica-
tors and the private monitoring approach. Hence, corruption of bank officials is less a barrier for 
companies to raise capital in countries that promote information provision and countries with 
developed legal systems and efficient governments. The findings are consistent with the argument 
that private monitoring reduces bank corruption, enhancing banking efficiency.
Pasiouras et al. (2006) analysed the impact of accounting and disclosure requirements and 
auditing requirements on bank credit ratings and found that both coefficients appear negative in 
the regressions. This is inconsistent with studies that indicate that empowering private monitoring 
enhances bank performance as well as with those that indicate that accounting and auditing 
systems reduce bank risk (Fernandez & Gonzalez, 2005). Nevertheless, the coefficients are only 
significant at 10% level, which is consistent with the findings of Barth et al. (2004) regarding the 
impact of private monitoring on the likelihood of a banking crisis. Additionally, the empirical 
evidence of Demirguc-Kunt et al. (B2008) supported that compliance with dissemination of accu-
rate information is positively associated with bank soundness. Thus, banks in countries that 
strengthen private monitoring are better rated.
Focusing on the findings of the aforementioned studies about the effects of strengthening 
private monitoring on banking efficiency, we aim to test the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4: Private monitoring does not have a positive or significant impact on banking 
efficiency.
This study investigates the impact of bank regulatory measures namely, capital regulation, activity 
restrictions, official supervisory power and private monitoring on banking efficiency in the EU. The 
methodology we follow is closely related to various research on banking efficiency. To measure 
banking efficiency, we use two accounting ratios: net interest margin and overhead costs. Likewise, 
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Barth et al. (2004), Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2004), and Levine (2005) used accounting ratios as opposed 
to studies that used efficient frontier analysis (Barth et al., 2013b). Chortareas et al. (2012) measured 
banking efficiency using accounting ratios as well as the DEA technique. Both methods produced the 
same results. Therefore, we decide to use accounting ratios. However, it is important to emphasize 
that bank net interest margin and overhead costs are imperfect measures of banking efficiency. In 
order to overcome this limitation, we control for bank-specific and country-specific variables.
3. Data and methodology
In this section, we present information about the data and the methodology employed in our 
research. We discuss the data collected, sources and sample selection, the definition of the variables 
and the descriptive statistics. This is followed by the introduction of the econometric models, 
description of the estimation procedure and the tests performed to obtain accurate results.
3.1. Data
This study aims to evaluate the impact of bank regulatory measures on banking efficiency. To 
assemble the cross-section data, we include commercial banks operating in 21 EU countries, namely: 
Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain.
The dataset is compiled from two primary sources, SNL Financial database provided by S&P 
Global Market Intelligence and World Bank databases. The bank-specific variables: net interest 
margin, overhead costs, bank size, bank equity and bank market share are obtained from SNL 
Financial database. The annual growth rate of GDP per capita is obtained from the World Bank 
World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2010). The regulatory measures: capital regulation, 
activity restrictions, official supervisory power and private monitoring, as well as the government- 
owned banks, are obtained from the last survey of the Bank Regulation and Supervision Survey 
carried out by the World Bank (Barth et al., 2004, 2008, 2013a, 2006, 2013b; Cihak et al., 2012). As 
the answers from this survey correspond to the year 2010, we collect data for the same year. 
Moreover, we follow the indexes constructed and made available by Barth et al. (2006) and 
(2013a), which aggregates the responses to individual questions into indexes.
Since the availability of data varies by country and by bank, we edit the raw data with the purpose 
of minimising the errors in our analysis. Therefore, our sample comprises only the observations for 
which all variables are available. The initial sample included 28 EU countries.5 The Czech Republic and 
Sweden did not respond to the survey. Hence, we do not have information on any regulatory variable 
for these countries. Therefore, they are dropped from our sample, resulting in 1218 banks from 26 
countries. After dropping the observations without information for the bank-specific variables, there 
are 1019 banks from 24 countries, Latvia and Lithuania are excluded. Although the United Kingdom, 
Germany and Estonia responded to the survey, there are missing values for the regulatory variables. 
For the United Kingdom, the information is not available for official supervisory power; for Germany, 
information is not available for activity restrictions; for Estonia, information is not available for private 
monitoring. Consequently, the final sample used in our study to examine the impact of regulation on 
banking efficiency consists of 678 banks from 21 EU countries.
3.1.1. Net interest margin and overhead costs
To measure banking efficiency, we use two accounting ratios: net interest margin and overhead costs. 
We collected data for net interest margin and overhead costs from 2010 since the information for 
bank regulation is from this year. Net interest margin equals interest income minus interest expense 
divided by total assets. The net interest margin measures the gap between what banks pay to their 
lenders and what banks receive from their borrowers, hence it reflects the conventional lending and 
borrowing operations of the bank. Similar to previous papers, we interpret the net interest margin as 
a signal of intermediation inefficiency and excessive market power, allowing banks to charge higher 
interest. Thus, higher values of net interest margin reflect lower levels of banking efficiency.
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Overhead costs equal operating expenses divided by total assets. High overhead costs reflect 
unwarranted managerial perquisites as well as higher market power, which is inconsistent with the 
efficient intermediation of the banking system. Hence, higher values of overhead costs are asso-
ciated with lower levels of banking efficiency. It is expected that both dependent variables produce 
identical results (Barth et al., 2008; Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2004; Levine, 2005).
In our econometric model, we use the logarithm values of both net interest margin (LOGNIM) and 
overhead costs (LOGOC) with the aim of normalising the distribution of the variables and conse-
quently decrease their fluctuation. Graphically, we can perceive that the distribution of the variables 
before the logarithm values exhibits high skewness and high kurtosis. Using the logarithm, the values 
of skewness and kurtosis are closer to the values for the standard normal distribution.
Differences across banks in net interest margin and overhead costs may reflect differences in 
bank activities, business systems, or asset allocations rather than differences in banking efficiency. 
In order to mitigate possible interpretational issues with the measures of banking efficiency and be 
able to find the independent relationship between them and bank regulation, we control for the 
bank and country-specific variables.
3.1.2. Regulatory variables
With the purpose of evaluating the impact of bank regulation on banking efficiency, we include 
four regulatory measures in our study, namely, capital regulation, activity restrictions, official 
supervisory power, and private monitoring. We provide the description of these variables and the 
range of the corresponding indexes constructed by Barth et al. (2006), (2013a)). The regulatory 
measures data were collected from the last survey. Hence, it refers to the year 2010.
The capital regulatory variable (CAPREG) is an index that incorporates the initial capital strin-
gency and the overall capital stringency. The initial capital stringency concerns whether the 
sources of regulatory capital can include assets other than cash, government securities or bor-
rowed funds and whether the regulatory/supervisory authorities verify them. The overall capital 
stringency concerns whether Basel I is the applied capital adequacy regime, whether the capital 
requirement reflects market or credit risk, whether market value losses are deducted, and the 
fraction of revaluation gains permitted. The capital regulatory index ranges from 0 to 10 with 
higher values indicating greater capital stringency.
The activity restrictions variable (ACTRES) is an index that measures the degree to which banks 
are allowed to engage in non-traditional activities, specifically, securities, insurance and real estate 
activities. Securities activities include brokering, underwriting, dealing, and all aspects of the 
mutual fund industry. Insurance activities include underwriting and selling. Real estate activities 
include management, investment and development. The activity restrictions index ranges from 4 
to 16 with higher values indicating greater restrictiveness.
The official supervisory power variable (SPOWER) is an index that concerns whether official 
supervisors have the power to act on bank owners, auditors, and managers in different circum-
stances with the intention of preventing and correcting problems. This includes whether the 
supervisory authority is allowed to share information with external auditors, declare bank insol-
vency, supersede the rights of shareholders, change bank managers and directors, build a legal 
case against auditors in case of negligence, require banks to constitute provisions to cover losses, 
require banks to reduce or suspend dividends, bonuses and other remunerations and whether 
auditors are required to report unlawful activities. The official supervisory power index ranges from 
0 to 14 with higher values indicating a greater power of supervisory authorities.
The private monitoring variable (PMONIT) is an index that measures the degree to which supervisors 
require banks to disclose accurate and detailed information to officials and the public, promoting the 
monitoring of banks by the private sector. It involves whether professional external auditors audit 
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banks, whether international and domestic rating entities rate banks, whether there is an explicit 
deposit insurance scheme and the compensation received by insured depositors the last time a bank 
failed, whether banks are required to produce consolidated accounts and disclose off-balance sheet 
items, whether accrued or unpaid interest or principal are included in the income statement on 
performing and non-performing loans, whether bank directors are legal responsible for the accuracy 
of the information disclosed and whether subordinated debt is allowed. The private monitoring index 
ranges from 0 to 12 with higher values indicating greater private monitoring of banks.
3.1.3. Control variables
At the bank-level, we use three key control variables: bank size, bank equity and bank market 
share. At the country-level, we control for the GDP growth and the government-owned banks. We 
use 2010 values as the data for the regulatory variables corresponds to this year. Since we find the 
same results when we omit the control variables, endogeneity problems are not biasing our 
conclusions regarding the effects of bank regulation on banking efficiency.
Bank size (LOGTA) is measured as the logarithm of total bank assets in US dollars. We control for 
bank size to capture the effect on bank lending behaviour. Moreover, this variable may have 
a considerable impact on net interest margin and overhead costs in case of increasing returns 
to scale in the banking industry. Bank equity (EQTA) is measured as the book value of bank equity 
divided by total bank assets. We use this variable as previous papers (e.g. Berger, 1995) supported 
that well-capitalised banks face lower bankruptcy costs, hence lower funding costs. Therefore, 
higher values of bank equity may imply higher net interest margin and overhead costs. Bank 
market share (MS) equals the total assets of the bank divided by the total commercial bank assets 
in the country. Banks with greater market share may experience greater market power, conse-
quently greater net interest margin and overhead costs.
Government-owned banks (GOVERN) equals the fraction of the banking system’s assets that is 
held by banks with 50% or more government-ownership. This variable measures the ownership 
structure of the banking system. La Porta et al. (2002) suggested that government-owned banks 
tend to allocate resources to benefit politicians and therefore tend to be less efficient. According to 
this perspective, we expect government-owned banks to exert a positive impact on net interest 
margin and overhead costs. GDP growth (GDPGR) equals the annual growth rate of GDP per capita. 
We include this variable to control for business-cycle forces of the macroeconomic environment. 
Since the demand for financial services depends on the cyclical conditions, GDP growth may have 
a positive influence on banking efficiency.
3.1.4. Descriptive statistics
This paragraph presents and discusses the key descriptive statistics for the dependent and 
independent variables used in our regression analysis.
Table 1 shows the summary statistics of all the variables used to study the impact of bank 
regulatory measures on banking efficiency. The average for the LOGNIM is −4.24, with a minimum 
of −11.10 and a maximum of −1.58. The number of observations of this variable (671) is lower 
compared to the number of observations of all the other variables (678). The difference refers to 
the banks from our sample with values of net interest margin equal to 0, since the logarithm of 0 is 
not computable. The average for the LOGOC is −4.09, with a minimum of 9.95 and a maximum of 
−0.42. Regarding the regulatory variables, CAPREG has an average of 6.70 with a standard deviation 
of 1.56, a minimum of 4 and a maximum of 9. As the range of this index is from 0 to 10, we can 
conclude that the 21 EU countries have a medium-high level of capital stringency. For the ACTRES, the 
average is 6.21 with a standard deviation of 1.7, a minimum of 4 and a maximum of 11. The banks in 
our sample are less regulated in terms of engaging in securities, insurance, and real estate activities, 
compared to the capital as the range of the former is from 4 to 16. The average SPOWER is 11.29 with 
a standard deviation of 1.9, a minimum of 5 and a maximum of 9. Since this index ranges from 0 to 
14, we can conclude that the official supervisory authorities in the considered countries have great 
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power to take actions against bank owners, managers and auditors. Lastly, the average for the 
PMONIT is 8.32 with a standard deviation of 1.06, a minimum of 6 and a maximum of 11. Given 
that the range of this index is from 0 to 12 and considering the statistics, we can conclude that the 
banking regulations in the countries of our sample promote private monitoring of banks. The fact that 
the countries in our sample promote both official supervisory power and private monitoring is 
consistent with the theory that the two approaches are not mutually exclusive as discussed in the 
literature review. Considering the control variables, the average LOGTA is 6.53, with a minimum of 
3.42 and a maximum of 9.51. The average for the EQTA is 0.12, with a minimum of −0.01 and 
a maximum of 1. For the MS, the average is 0.03, the minimum is approximately 0, and the maximum 
is 0.58, meaning that there is at least one bank in a country that holds more than 50% of the total 
commercial bank assets in that country. The GOVERN has an average of 0.07, a minimum of 0 and 
a maximum of 0.51. These statistics reflect that there are one or more countries in our sample 
without government-owned banks, as well as at least one country where government-owned banks 
hold more than 50% of total banking assets in that country. The average for the GDPGR is 0.01, with 
a minimum of −0.06 and a maximum of 0.05, reflecting that there are countries with negative growth 
rates of GDP per capita and even the highest value reflects positive but low growth rate.
3.2. Model description
To assess the effect of bank regulatory measures on banking efficiency while controlling for bank- 
specific and country-specific variables, we estimate the following two models: 
LOGOCi;t ¼ αþ β1CAPREGt þ β2ACTRESt þ β3SPOWERt þ β4PMONITt
β5Bi;t þ β6Ct þ εi
(1)  
LOGOCi;t ¼ αþ β1CAPREGt þ β2ACTRESt þ β3SPOWERt þ β4PMONITt
β5Bi;t þ β6Ct þ εi
(2) 
Where i refers to bank i, t refers to country t, α is the intercept, Bi,t is a vector of bank-specific variables 
for bank i in country t, Ct is a vector of country-specific variables in country t and εi,t is the residual. The 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum Observations
LOGNIM 
LOGOC
−4.24 0.98 −11.10 −1.58 671
−4.09 1.24 −9.95 −0.42 678
CAPREG 
ACTRES
6.70 1.56 4 9 678
6.21 1.70 4 11 678
SPOWER 
PMONIT
11.29 1.90 5 14 678






6.53 1.00 3.42 9.51 678
0.12 0.13 −0.01 1.00 678
0.03 0.07 0.00 0.58 678
0.07 0.09 0 0.51 678
0.01 0.02 −0.06 0.05 678
Note: This table presents the mean, standard deviation, minimum, maximum and number of observations of all 
variables used in this study for a sample of 21 EU countries for the year 2010. Sources: SNL Financial database, World 
Bank: Bank Regulation and Supervision Survey, and World Bank: World Development Indicators and own calculations. 
The bank-level variables include logarithm of net interest margin (LOGNIM), logarithm of overhead costs (LOGOC), 
bank size (LOGTA), bank equity (EQTA) and bank market share (MS). The country-level variables include capital 
regulation (CAPREG), activity restrictions (ACTRES), official supervisory power (SPOWER), private monitoring 
(PMONIT), government-owned banks (GOVERN) and annual growth rate of GDP per capita (GDPGR). 
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measures of banking efficiency are two accounting ratios: the logarithm of net interest margin and 
logarithm of overhead costs. In model (1), the dependent variable is LOGNIMi which represents the 
logarithm of net interest margin for bank i in country t. In model (2), the dependent variable is LOGOCi, 
which represents the logarithm of overhead costs for bank i in country t. CAPREGt is the capital 
regulation variable in country t and β1 is the coefficient which explains the effect of capital regulation 
on banking efficiency. ACTRESt corresponds to the activity restrictions variable in country t and β2 is the 
coefficient describing the impact of activity restrictions on banking efficiency. SPOWERt denotes the 
official supervisory power variable in country t and β3 is the effect of official supervisory power on 
banking efficiency. PMONITt is the private monitoring variable in country t and β4 describes the influence 
of private monitoring on banking efficiency. The vectors Bi, and Ci including the bank-specific variables 
and the country-specific variables, respectively, are defined as follows: 
Bi;t ¼ LOGTAi;t; EQTAi;t;MSi;t
  �
Ct ¼ GOVERBt;GDPGRtð Þ
The vector Bi contains bank size, bank equity and bank market share. Bank size is proxied by the 
logarithm of total assets for bank i in country t (LOGTAI). Bank equity is measured as the equity to 
assets ratio for bank i in country t (EQTAi). Bank market share is assessed by the ratio between the 
total assets of the bank and the total commercial bank assets in the country for bank i in country t. 
The vector Ct includes the government-owned banks variable in country t (GOVERNi) and the 
annual growth rate of GDP per capita in country t (GDPGRt).
Previous to the regression of model 1 and 2, it is necessary to check whether the variables are 
suitable for our cross-section data and whether the assumptions about our data are fulfilled. 
Therefore, we examine the graphical distribution and the measures of skewness and kurtosis of 
the variables. The skewness and kurtosis values for standard normal distribution are 0 and 3, 
respectively. The only variables whose values are significantly different from the standards are net 
interest margin and overhead costs. As previously mentioned, we use the logarithm values to solve 
this problem by normalising the distribution of the variables. From Figures 1 and 2, we can perceive 
the difference before and after the logarithm values.
In order to regress the models, we use the OLS estimation as the method that best fits our data. 
Since heteroskedasticity is often a problem in cross-section data, we test both models for the 
presence of heteroskedasticity using the Breusch–Pagan test. The null hypothesis of the test refers 
to the presence of homoskedasticity. The p-value for both models equals 0.00, hence, we reject the 
null hypothesis. Thus, we use the heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in our regressions.
Figure 1. Histograms of net 
interest margin and logarithm 
of net interest margin, Source: 
the authors.
Bace & Ferreira, Cogent Economics & Finance (2020), 8: 1838735                                                                                                                                    
https://doi.org/10.1080/23322039.2020.1838735
Page 14 of 21
4. Empirical results
In this section, we present and discuss the main results of the estimated regressions. We compare 
our findings with the expected findings included in our hypotheses, which consider the evidence 
presented in previous banking literature. Explanations for possible inconsistencies are also 
examined.
Table 2 presents the regressions results of bank regulation on banking efficiency proxied by the 
logarithm of net interest margin and overhead costs while controlling for bank-specific and 
country-specific variables. To recall, we interpret the results as higher values of net interest margin 
and overhead costs are associated with lower levels of banking efficiency.
Figure 2. Histograms of over-
head costs and logarithm of 
overhead costs, Source: the 
authors.
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Our results do not suggest a strong relationship between capital regulation and banking effi-
ciency. While capital regulation enters positively in both regressions, the coefficient is not statis-
tically significant. This is inconsistent with the expected positive and significant effect of capital 
regulation on banking efficiency described in hypothesis 1. The results are also inconsistent with 
previous studies (Barth et al., 2013b; Chortareas et al., 2012) that found a significantly positive 
impact on banking efficiency. On the contrary, Barth et al. (2004) reported an insignificant link 
between capital regulation and net interest margin or overhead costs, which supports the results 
in Table 2.
The results also indicate that restricting bank activities is associated with lower levels of banking 
efficiency, as confirmed by the positive and significant coefficients at the 1% level. The size of the 
coefficients is substantial. That is, a one unit increase in activity restrictions increases net interest margin 
by 17.5% (100* (e0.161 − 1)) and overhead costs by 19.1% (100* (e0.175 − 1)). Moreover, our findings 
support hypothesis 2 that activity restrictions have a negative and significant impact on banking 
efficiency. Similarly, Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2004), Chortareas et al. (2012), and Barth et al. (2013b) 
provided evidence that greater activity restrictions negatively affect the efficiency of the banking 
system.
Table 2 regressions show that there is a negative relationship between official supervisory power 
and banking efficiency, which supports hypothesis 3. The link is significant at the 5% level in 
the second regression when considering overhead costs as the dependent variable. For the first 
regression, official supervisory power is not significant in explaining net interest margin. This is in 
accordance with previous banking literature (Barth et al., 2004, 2013b; Levine, 2005) that found no 
robust impact of official supervisory power on banking efficiency as well as with Chortareas et al. 
(2012) that found a positive and significant impact on overhead costs when including the private 
monitoring variable.
As for the private monitoring variable, the coefficient enters significantly and negatively in both 
regressions. For the net interest margin regression, the coefficient is significant only at the 10% level, 
while for the overhead costs it is significant at the 1% level. The coefficients are considerably large, 
hence a one unit increase in private monitoring decreases net interest margin by 12.6% (100* 
(e0.119 − 1)) and overhead costs by 18.6% (100* (e0.171 − 1)). The results confirmed that promoting 
private monitoring enhances banking efficiency as predicted in our hypothesis 4. This finding is in line 
with previous studies on banking efficiency (Barth et al., 2004, 2013b; Levine, 2005) that presented 
empirical evidence in favour of empowering private monitoring. On the other hand, our results are in 
contrast with the study conducted by Chortareas et al. (2012) that found a positive impact of private 
monitoring on efficiency levels.








Note: This table exhibits the estimates from OLS regressions of model 1 and 2, explaining the relationship between 
bank regulation and banking efficiency. The dependent variable of model 1 is logarithm of net interest margin 
(LOGNIM) and model 2 is logarithm of overhead costs (LOGOC). The independent variables of both models are: capital 
regulation (CAPREG), activity restrictions (ACTRES), official supervisory power (SPOWER), private monitoring (PMONIT), 
bank size (LOGTA), bank equity (EQTA), bank market share (MS), government-owned banks (GOVERN) and annual 
growth rate of GDP per capita (GDPGR). The symbols *, **, *** indicate the statistical significance of the estimated 
coefficients at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively. The robust standard errors are in parentheses below the estimated 
coefficients. The number of observations, R-squared and F statistic of each regression are also presented in this Table. 
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Considering the vector of bank-specific control variables, large banks tend to have lower net 
interest margin and lower overhead costs. Therefore, bank size is positively and significantly at the 
1% level associated with banking efficiency. This may be caused by economies of scale in the 
banking sector. The finding is in accordance with the evidence presented by Altunbas et al. (2007) 
and Yildirim and Philippatos (2007) for EU countries. The results for bank equity reveal a positive 
impact on net interest margin and overhead costs. However, the coefficient is only significant in 
the second regression at the 10% significance level. This finding confirms that well-capitalised 
banks have more opportunities for higher net interest margin and overhead costs. Bank market 
share appears to be an essential driver of banking efficiency as confirmed by the positive and 
significant coefficients at the 1% level in both regressions. This supports the view that banks with 
more significant market share experience greater market power and consequently, larger net 
interest margin and overhead costs.
At the country level, we control for government-owned banks and GDP growth. The govern-
ment-owned banks positively affect net interest margin and negatively affect overhead costs. 
Nevertheless, the former relationship is not significant while the latter is significant at the 1% 
level. The banking literature supports that the presence of the government stimulates corruption 
in the banking industry, hence promoting banking inefficiency. Our results are inconsistent with 
this view. Additionally, the annual growth rate of GDP per capita enters negatively in both 
regressions. The estimated coefficients are significant at the 1% level. This finding indicates 
that expanding markets, as measured by a higher growth rate, tend to have more efficient 
banking.
Some of our findings are not consistent with previous literature (Altunbas et al., 2007) on the 
impact of regulatory measures on banking efficiency, especially regarding capital regulation. 
Nevertheless, our study differs from the previous ones in a few aspects. First, we are considering 
the EU countries while most of the studies consider a large cross-country sample. Second, we are 
using the data from the last survey of the Bank Regulation and Supervision Survey carried out by 
the World Bank. This is the only study evaluating the impact of bank regulation on banking 
efficiency using the last survey. For instance, Barth et al. (2013a) and Cihak et al. (2012) presented 
and discussed the responses to the last survey and compared them to earlier surveys. However, 
the impact on banking efficiency is not assessed. Lastly, this survey is the first survey conducted 
after the financial crisis. The global financial crisis has drawn the attention of policymakers to the 
need to reform banking regulation since it has highlighted problems with the banking sector. 
Hence, discrepancies with previous studies may exist.
5. Conclusion
The global financial crisis has emphasised the importance of regulatory policies for the proper 
functioning of the banking system. In this regard, our study contributes to the existing literature by 
assessing the impact of the Basel II Capital Accord regulations in addition to activity restrictions on 
banking efficiency. Specifically, we examine the impact of capital regulation, activity restrictions, 
official supervisory power and private monitoring. In order to do so, we develop a set of hypoth-
eses in line with our predictions considering the existent empirical evidence. We collected data for 
a sample of 678 banks from 21 EU countries: Austria, Belgium,
Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain for the year 2010. We 
used two alternative accounting ratios to measure banking efficiency, namely net interest margin 
and overhead costs. We used OLS estimation to regress the empirical models. Also, we employed 
cross-section data techniques to minimise the errors of our analysis.
The results show that strengthening capital regulation is negatively but not significantly associated 
with banking efficiency. This finding does not imply that capital regulation is irrelevant for banking 
efficiency. It merely suggests that the link between capital regulation and banking efficiency is not 
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sufficiently robust when controlling for other regulatory policies, bank and country characteristics. 
Regarding activity restrictions, we find that tighter activity restrictions are negatively associated with 
banking efficiency. By promoting the exchange of information, banks that engage in broader activities 
such as securities, insurance and real estate investment may benefit from economies of scale and scope, 
hence enhancing the efficiency levels. Similarly, we find that policies that promote official supervision 
may have adverse effects on banking efficiency. The results indicate that the official supervisory 
approach is ineffective in reducing overhead costs. However, the estimated coefficient is not significant 
enough to explain the behaviour of the net interest margin variable. The empirical evidence supports the 
private monitoring approach. Countries that require banks to disclose accurate and detailed information 
to the public tend to have a more efficient banking system. Basel II Capital Accord emphasises the 
importance of capital regulation, official supervisory power and private monitoring. Nevertheless, our 
findings incline to the negative aspects of capital regulation and official supervisory power.
Moreover, we find that bank-specific and country-specific control variables help explain banking 
efficiency. Larger banks with lower market share tend to have higher efficiency levels as confirmed 
by the significant negative coefficient of bank size and the significant positive coefficient of bank 
market share. Bank equity appears to be an important driver of banking efficiency only in 
the second model when overhead costs are used as a proxy. Similarly, government-owned banks 
variable only influences banking efficiency when considering overhead costs. This finding supports 
that countries that promote government-owned banks are more effective in reducing overhead 
costs, thus improving banking efficiency. Additionally, the growth rate of GDP per capita is 
negatively associated with net interest margin and overhead costs. In this perspective, the banking 
sector in expanding countries is significantly more efficient.
Our evidence overall suggests that the link between capital regulation and banking efficiency as 
measured by net interest margin and overhead costs is not robust enough to control for other 
regulatory variables. The results confirm that activity restrictions have a negative and significant 
impact on banking efficiency. Also, policies that encourage official supervisory power do not 
enhance the efficiency of the banking sector. The only approach that is positively and statistically 
significantly associated with efficiency is private monitoring.
This study may be subject to some limitations, therefore our findings should be interpreted 
carefully. First, we used cross-section data instead of panel data since information on regulatory 
measures is collected from the last survey conducted by the World Bank. Thus, the data is only 
available for one point in time (i.e. Bank, 2010). It is argued that banking efficiency is better 
estimated with panel data (Coelli et al., 2005). Another limitation of this study is the measures of 
banking efficiency. The literature on banking efficiency highlights the advantages of efficient 
frontier approaches compared to traditional accounting ratios (Berger & Humphrey, 1997; Fethi 
& Pasiouras, 2010). Besides, we consider 21 EU countries. Due to data unavailability, we do not 
consider all EU countries. As explained in the third section, countries economically large as 
Germany and the United Kingdom are not included, which could influence our results.
6. Recommendations
Given the negative relationship found between banking efficiency and official supervisory power, 
the recommendation for policy makers is to re-direct resources away from official supervision and 
towards private monitoring, a concept that has been promulgated in the Basel II framework. 
Moreover, supervision should not focus on restricting activities, as this is seen to have a significant 
and negative impact on banking efficiency. Supervisors should also recognize that, while capital 
regulation can be important for individual banks, it does very little for banking efficiency, but 
government-owned banks can contribute to system efficiency.
There are other regulatory policies than those considered in this study, such as financial con-
glomerate variables, competition, regulatory variables and deposit insurance scheme, which could 
affect banking efficiency. Larger sample size and additional regulatory variables could be 
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considered. To further explore implications of regulatory policies, several characteristics of the 
banking system can be studied such as loan growth and bank competition.
Given the vast scope of banking regulation, many aspects can be explored in the future.
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Notes
1. The study uses inefficiency as proxy for banking effi-
ciency in the DEA approach. Instead of measuring how 
close the bank is from the non-parametric efficient 
frontier, the study measures how far it is. By definition, 
the best practice banks are 100% efficient, therefore 
inefficiency equals the difference between 100 and the 
efficiency score.
2. The definition of financial conglomerates adopted in 
this paper is the same proposed by Laeven and Levine 
(2007).
3. See, for example, King and Levine (1993) and Levine 
(1997) for empirical evidence.
4. The study separated financial crisis into three cate-
gories: banking crisis, currency crisis and debt crisis. 5 
Bank charter value is defined as the value that would 
be foregone in case of closure. The study measures 
bank charter value with Tobin’s Q ratio.
5. The 28 EU countries are: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, 
Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, 
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom.
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